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abstract This article aims at studying the effect of the state of the economy and the charac-
teristics of the party supply in Parliament on regional cabinet size. We complement previous 
literature on the characteristics of governments and analyse whether the magnitude of the 
cabinet varies as a function of the state of the economy, the number of opposition parties and 
the level of party polarization for the opposition parties. Results show that better economic 
conditions and a larger number of opposition political parties in parliament are associated 
with a larger number of portfolios. Ideological polarization of the parties in the legislature 
does not seem to have an influence when designing the cabinet structure. Findings also 
show that the effect of the economic conditions is not equal for all cabinets: cabinets with 
less political constraints (majority status or fewer opposition parties) will be more sensitive 
to economic vicissitudes. This article, therefore, highlights how the parliamentary scenario 
and the economic context significantly influence the decisions on how to form or reshuffle 
a cabinet.
keywords cabinet size; recession; fragmentation; polarization; regional cabinets.
1. Introduction
After the outbreak of the 2008 world financial crisis, we have witnessed 
a heated debate around the size of the public administration. Some prime 
ministers have decided to reduce the size of public bodies, a decision that 
normally came in parallel with the reduction of the number of ministerial 
posts. Although merging ministries has a small marginal effect on overall 
spending, reducing the executive size has normally been employed as a tool 
for political propaganda. During bad economic times, some governments 
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decide to present themselves as role models: cabinets are eager to show that 
they are also able to tighten their belts — like the citizens they govern — and 
do the same (or even more) with less. 
Besides the importance of the economy for the size of the administration, 
cabinets do change in size even when there is no economic crisis in the agen-
da. Thus, an alternative argument can be made relating the role of the legis-
lature in shaping the size of the cabinet. In parliamentary systems, cabinets 
ultimately rely on parliaments in order to put forward their legislative and 
executive agendas. Governments are constrained by the political competition 
(the number of parties in Parliament) and by how polarized the existing par-
ties are. When the number of parties in the chamber is high, executives need 
to navigate through more political complexity. In a public sphere crowded 
by a great variety of political parties, governments need to devote more en-
ergy to be visible and to make their public policies clearer. A large number 
of parties in the legislature is likely to make cabinet size reduction plans less 
attractive. In a fragmented political landscape, each minister, and the public 
policies she promotes, is an important selling point. In fact, polarization 
and the number of parties may even provide more incentives to increase the 
number of cabinet positions. 
Although the importance of the economy and the role of party fragmentation 
and party polarization have been pinpointed by previous research, we lack a 
clear understanding of how these two factors affect the size of the cabinet. 
In short, the jury is still undecided as to whether the economy, the party 
composition of the legislature, and, especially, the interaction between both 
factors affect the size of the executive.
Thus, this article complements recent contributions on the determinants of 
the size of the cabinet1 by focusing on the role played by the economy and 
the partisan composition of the legislature — both in terms of the number 
of parties and ideological polarization.
Our hypotheses are put to the test in the context of the Spanish regions (Co-
munidades Autónomas). To do so, we make use of a novel dataset that includes 
1. Verzichelli, “Portfolio”; Indriðason and Bowler, “Determinants”; Vall-Prat and Rodon, 
“Decentralisation”.
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the size of the seventeen regional cabinets over the time period 1979 to 2015. 
The Spanish regions are a suitable case for testing the effect of the economy 
and the composition of the legislature, as there is substantial heterogeneity 
both across regions and over time. In other words, fragmentation and polar-
ization differs across regional parliaments and the economic recession did 
not hit all regions with the same intensity.  
Findings show that economic conditions do matter when analysing cabinet 
size at the subnational level in Spain. Worse (better) economic conditions 
are associated with a lower (larger) number of ministerial positions in a 
regional cabinet. This finding contradicts previous analyses at the national 
level, which point out the different dynamics of cabinet formation at distinct 
layers of government. Partisan fragmentation of the opposition is also linked 
to larger cabinets, while there is no sufficient evidence to relate ideological 
polarization to the size of a cabinet. A fragmented parliament implies more 
parties fighting for the attention of the public, thus the executive will try to 
maximize the attention of the media to its action by increasing the number 
of high-rank positions. 
Finally, our results also present an interaction between the economic and 
political context the cabinet faces; the state of the economy is only associated 
with variations in cabinet size when the cabinet has a relatively free reign 
over its decisions. That is, economic conditions are more influential when 
there is less fragmentation and/or the cabinet has a majority status in the 
legislature. This finding reminds us that, when it comes to the size of the 
cabinet (or even the administration), neither the economy nor the political 
conditions can be considered separately and it is important to consider both 
at once.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. In the next section we discuss 
previous literature on cabinet formation and we develop the expectations 
that will guide this paper. In Section 3 we present the methods and data. In 
Section 4 we display the main results. The last section concludes our findings 
and suggests avenues for future research. 
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2. Theoretical expectations
Although Aristotle highlighted the relevance of the number of people in 
charge of government, few efforts have been devoted to cabinet size in polit-
ical science studies. While government formation processes have been widely 
studied, specifically by scholars interested in coalition governments, cabinet 
size variations have rarely attracted such attention. 
Only recently more efforts are being devoted to understand the determi-
nants of the variation in the size of executives. In this respect, Indriðason 
and Bowler provided a few years ago a valuable starting point in order to 
understand why some countries have a bigger executives than others.2 They 
showed that ideological cohesiveness among cabinet members, the size of 
the legislature and coalition governments are significant factors associat-
ed with larger national cabinets — see also Verzichelli.3 Another recent 
contribution comes from Vall-Prat and Rodon,4 who analysed under what 
conditions decentralization leads to larger or smaller cabinets. They found 
that regions with more welfare state policies, especially when the region’s 
economic capacity is high, as well as nationally distinct regions, tend to 
have bigger executives. In contrast, decentralisation in the form of basic 
state functions and partisan congruence (i.e. whether the same party holds 
power at both the national and subnational level) do not have a statistically 
significant effect.
Despite the promising avenues opened up by recent contributions, it remains 
unclear whether bad economic times and whether the number of parties, and 
their ideological dispersion, influence the size of the regional cabinet. This is 
an important void in the literature insofar as the ramifications of the effect 
of the economy and the legislature’s party composition (and the interaction 
between both) are not clear-cut. 
Next, we review the previous literature on the topic — which has only 
indirectly tackled the relationship we aim at studying — and develop our 
2. Indriðason and Bowler, “Determinants”.
3. Verzichelli, “Portofolio”.
4. Vall-Prat and Rodon, “Decentralisation”.
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theoretical expectations regarding the relationship between the economic 
situation, the parliament’s composition and cabinet size.   
2.1. Cabinet size and the effect of the economy
Conventional wisdom states that the economy has an effect on the size of the 
public administration, as well as the number of portfolios in the executive. 
In other words, government size and GDP variability are strongly related.5 
This idea is based on the (plausible) assumption that, in difficult economic 
periods, cabinets will reduce their current spending, which may affect some 
ministries more than others. When the economy slides into recession, govern-
ments are likely to implement cuts, which may affect basic provisions of the 
welfare state system, such as pensions, unemployment benefits or childcare. 
Under this situation, the party (or parties) in government also adapt their 
political rhetoric in order to justify these difficult measures. Economic cuts 
are very unpopular measures and governments try to ameliorate their neg-
ative effects with a variety of political strategies. Indeed, these measures are 
often complemented with a political discourse of scapegoating by blaming 
the international forces, the opposition, or the previous government. Most 
importantly for our argument, during bad economic times, governments 
very often attempt to set an example with symbolic policy measures such 
as reducing the size of the cabinet. Although the relative effect of removing 
one or two ministries on the overall budget is rather low,6 governing parties 
want to signal that everyone is suffering from the cuts, even politicians, and 
that they are the first to implement restrictions on public spending.  
This process is likely to be especially intense among regional cabinets of decen-
tralized countries, such as Spain. There are at least two reasons to expect this. 
Firstly, in difficult economic periods, both national and regional cabinets will 
reduce their current spending. However, a region’s budget is more likely to be 
affected. Regions, even when the country’s level of federalism is high, are likely 
5. Galí, “Government Size”; Afonso and Furceri, “Government Size, Composition”.
6. Eliminating a ministry does not usually imply removing all secretaries, sub-secretaries 
or other public bodies below the ministry rank. These are normally merged with other 
ministries or, on a few occasions, eliminated. In the Spanish administration, it is fairly easy 
to eliminate public bodies, but it is difficult to fire public servants. Therefore, while saving 
may often be notable, the effect of removing ministries on the overall spending is rather low. 
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to benefit from transfers from the central government. In bad economic times, 
regional governments have to reduce their budget and cope with the lower 
level of transfers from the central cabinet. This is clearly the case in Spain, as 
regional governments are normally relatively dependent on the State’s fiscal 
transfers to the regions.7 As the region’s capacity to raise taxes or to change 
economic policies is relatively limited, regional public finances are more likely 
to be affected. Secondly, recession outbursts can trigger political debates over 
the responsibility of the economic crisis. In many countries, national govern-
ments use the regions as a scapegoat to justify the overall economic problems.8
Despite the prominence of the previous narrative in the public debate, we 
do not have strong empirical evidence that supports this claim. The only ex-
isting evidence comes from Verzichelli,9 who found a negative relationship, 
namely that the cabinet expands during recessions. Indriðason and Bowler’s 
work, however, does not include any economic measure as a control variable 
in their research. In fact, most of the academic literature dealing with the 
relationship between cabinet size and the state of the economy has primar-
ily focused on the inverse relationship, that is, on the effect the size of the 
government has on different outcomes. For example, scholars have looked at 
how the magnitude of the cabinet influences the economic performance of 
both public institutions and the economy in general, showing that cabinet 
size is a good predictor of governments’ budget variation or public deficits.10
Here we reverse the order of causality from the traditional approach and 
expect regional cabinet size to change according to the economic circum-
stances. Despite Verzichelli’s findings, we expect a different logic for regional 
cabinets. In line with the theoretical argument developed before, we expect 
that regional cabinets will be more sensitive to GDP variations than national 
cabinets. More specifically, we hypothesize that economic recessions will 
decrease the size of regional cabinets. 
H1: Increases (decreases) in GDP are associated with larger (smaller) cabinets.
7. Simon-Cosano, Lago-Peñas, and Vaquero “On the Political Determinants”.
8. Muro, “When Do Countries Recentralize”.
9. Verzichelli, “Portofolio”.
10. Haan and Volkerink, “Fragmented Government”; Woo, “Economic, Political and Insti-
tutional”.
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2.2. Cabinet size, fragmentation and polarization
Parliamentary political systems are characterized by the influence of par-
liaments over cabinets. Parties need to be elected to parliament to be able to 
influence, not only the legislative process, but also the executive power. More 
fragmented and complex parliaments increase the hurdles for government 
formation, a complexity that has been a major topic of interest for political 
science scholars.11 
In some parliamentary political systems, coalitions are not common and mi-
nority governments are sometimes an alternative.12 Fragmented parliaments 
make the formation of single-party majority cabinets less likely. Even if the 
cabinet is formed by a single party, often this party does not have an absolute 
majority in the chamber, which encourages multilateral agreements between 
different political parties. In short, in parliamentary systems parties that 
hold executive power very often need to reach agreements with opposition 
parties. Spain is not an exception.13
Figure 1 shows the percentage of cabinets for each Western European country 
that have relied on coalition agreements. The figure shows that coalitions 
are the most common governmental agreement. Single-party governments 
are more likely in places where the electoral system creates larger majorities 
(UK would be the paradigmatic case, but also Spain and Greece would fit) 
or where there is a large ideologically central party that makes alternative 
majorities unfeasible (as in Sweden or Norway). 
11. E.g. Budge and Laver, “Office Seeking”; Shepsle, “Positive Theory”; Laver and Shepsle, 
Making and Breaking Governments.
12. See Bergman, “Sweden”, for the Swedish case.
13. Reniu, “Gobiernos de coalición”.
87 REAF núm. 27, juny 2018, p. 80-116
Designing a regional cabinet
Figure 1. Percentage of coalition cabinets in West European countries
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Coalition cabinets in Western Europe
Source: ParlGov (Döring and Manow 2016)
This pattern is not only true for national cabinets but also for subnational 
layers of government. Figure 2 shows the same graph as in Figure 1 applied 
to the Spanish Autonomous Communities (ACs). Although in Figure 2 the 
number of coalitions is not as high as in the previous graph, we should make 
two considerations. First, subnational coalitions are frequent even in a coun-
try where there has not been any coalition at the national level.14 Second, ACs 
with a distinct regional party system — i.e. those where there are regional 
parties, beyond the two large Spanish parties (PSOE and PP) — tend to be 
governed by coalitions.
14. Ibid.
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Figure 2. Coalitions in Spanish ACs (1979-2014)
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Coalition cabinets in Spanish ACs
Source: Observatorio de los Gobiernos de Coalición (Reniu 2017)
We know from the existing literature that the number of parties in the 
cabinet is an important factor that explains portfolio distributions.15 In 
addition, the number of parties in the legislative chamber affects stability, 
public policies or the representation of public preferences, among others.16 
Notwithstanding these valuable contributions, we still do not have a clear 
15. One of the most widespread political science scientific laws precisely relates to the num-
ber of parties in a coalition with the number of portfolios each party will get. According to 
Gamson’s law — named after Gamson (“A Theory of Coalition Formation”) — each party 
will be in charge of a proportional share of portfolios, according to the number of MPs each 
party contributes to the coalition. Thus, in a two party coalition, a party that doubles the 
number of MPs of its partner will also be in charge of twice the number of portfolios the 
smaller party controls. 
16. See e.g. Persson and Tabellini, “Economic Effects”; Chhibber and Nooruddin, “Do Party 
Systems Count”.
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understanding of how the legislature’s fragmentation and polarization affect 
(regional) cabinet size. 
A priori we should expect that fragmented and/or polarized parliaments 
create stronger incentives for cabinets to highlight the role of the executive 
vis-à-vis the parliament. In a fragmented or polarized chamber, parties in 
control of the executive might use their preponderant position in order to 
strengthen their message and increase their public visibility. Hitherto, we 
only have anecdotal evidence that this process may be taking place: for in-
stance, Verzichelli suggests that the size of the legislature and the ideological 
cohesiveness among cabinet members are significant factors associated with 
larger national cabinets.17 
We also know from Maeda18 that there is a relationship between the fragmenta-
tion of the opposition and the electoral fortunes of governing parties. Maeda’s 
research shows that governing parties tend to obtain better electoral results 
when they face a fragmented opposition — i.e. when there are more parties not 
holding cabinet seats. The reason is because the division among the opposition 
parties makes it difficult for the opposition to have a unified discourse against 
the actions of the cabinet. The government, in turn, benefits from the disunion 
of the opposition. Accordingly, a higher opposition fragmentation may provide 
positive opportunities for cabinet parties. Among the political tools at their 
disposal, governing parties can try to make themselves visible over the oppo-
sition by creating a larger number of cabinet posts. If this is true, we should 
expect that, under a fragmented chamber, the cabinet has incentives to increase 
the number of ministries. By doing so, the government forces the opposition 
to focus on many different aspects, increasing the number of fronts to cover. 
This is likely to blur the critiques towards the government, as the message sent 
by the opposition becomes diverse and complex. 
In fact, it is common that the number of portfolios becomes one of the 
political tools in the hands of the cabinet used to send a political message. 
For instance, the Spanish government under Zapatero created a ministry 
on equality. Also, in the regional arena, the Catalan pro-secessionist cabinet 
of Carles Puigdemont, created in 2015 a new portfolio on Foreign Affairs; 
17. Verzichelli, “Portfolio”.
18. Maeda, “Divided We Fall”.
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although the attributions for a regional cabinet in the diplomatic field are 
very small, this was a way to signal that the Catalan cabinet wanted to 
act as a national-state cabinet. Creating new cabinet positions is a way 
the executive has to point out that a specific issue will be one of their 
priorities. When this happens, the opposition might be caught off guard. 
Opposition parties will need time to adapt and learn how to target more 
of these ministries. 
However, we should not only take into account the number of opposition 
parties in the parliament, but also their ideology. If the opposition parties in 
Parliament were to be very similar to each other, their interests would also be 
very similar, as well as their critiques towards the government. In contrast, if 
there were many opposition parties and their ideologies also diverged, then 
it would be reasonable for the cabinet to diversify the number of cabinet 
posts. In other words, the expectation is that, in ideologically-fragmented 
chambers, the cabinet needs to confront a wide number of ideologically-di-
verse issues, which may bring about incentives to increase the number of 
ministerial posts. 
Following the two previous theoretical expectations, we formulate the next 
two hypotheses as follows:
H2a: A larger effective number of opposition parties in parliament should increase 
the number of ministerial positions in the cabinet
H2b: Greater levels of polarization among opposition parties in parliament should 
increase cabinet size
2.3. The conditional role of the economy in different 
political scenarios
As we discussed in the previous sections, the first theoretical expectation 
is that economic crises have a negative effect on the size of the cabinet. In 
contrast, however, the number of parties or the polarization of the party 
system may provide incentives to increase the number of portfolios. These 
two theoretical expectations not only contradict each other, but, depending 
on the direction of the effect, they may also reinforce each other, or even 
91 REAF núm. 27, juny 2018, p. 80-116
Designing a regional cabinet
vanish when both are present. In other words, there might be a conditional 
effect such that the positive or the negative effect of both the economy and 
the number of parties is only present at high or low economic values.
During bad economic times, we do not know whether the economy logic 
(the size of the cabinet decreases) or the party logic (the cabinet’s magnitude 
increases) will be more relevant. In fact, if both are present at the same time, 
it may very well be that the effects are cancelled out and we do not observe 
any variation in cabinet’s sizes. Thus, we take an agnostic approach and we 
hypothesize that there will be an interactive effect between the state of the 
economy and the number (or ideology) of the parties in the opposition. 
H3a: The effect of the state of the economy on the size of the cabinet will be different 
across different numbers of political parties
H3b: The effect of the state of the economy on the size of the cabinet will be different 
depending on the polarization of the opposition parties. 
This is not the only conditional effect that can be hypothesized, as the state 
of the economy might not have the same effect on all types of cabinets. Sev-
eral factors, including economic shocks, can lead to electoral volatility, early 
termination of cabinets and the call for snap elections.19 However, when 
dealing with party cabinet duration, it is usually argued that one of the 
main factors leading to stable cabinets is the majority status of the cabinet.20 
Holding a majority is important for cabinets, as it affects their stability and 
their political calculus when deciding, for example, whether to increase or 
reduce the number of ministerial posts. 
We expect economic conditions to influence cabinet decisions on the distri-
bution of portfolios. Yet, we argue that this influence will depend on the cab-
inet majority status. While good economic conditions might lead the cabinet 
to expand the number of ministries — there is money available and it is a 
good way to publicize the executive’s decisions —, the absence of a majority 
and a closer scrutiny by the opposition parties might counterbalance this 
effect. Thus, we expect the effect of the economic conditions to be clearer 
19. Remmer, “Political Impact”.
20. King et al. “A Unified Model”; Laver, “Government Termination”.
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when the cabinet has fewer restraints from the Parliament. A cabinet less 
constrained by the political fights in parliament will have more freeway to 
arrange the cabinet at its will and will be more sensitive to variations in 
economic conditions. 
H3c: Increases in GDP are associated with larger cabinet size only when the cabinet 
has a majority in parliament.
3. Data and Research Design 
We employ a dataset that includes the size of the cabinet in all Spanish re-
gions between 1979 and 2015. Cabinet size is defined as the number of minis-
ters in the regional government, with or without a portfolio.21 It is notewor-
thy that, following Indriðason and Kam,22 cabinets included in the dataset 
are both postelectoral cabinets and any reshuffle made during the legislative 
term which involved more than two ministries or ministers.  
To study the effects of the economic context and of party fragmentation and 
polarization on cabinet size we will exploit the regional variation on cabinet 
sizes in Spain. The Spanish subnational arena is a suitable case for our anal-
ysis, as ACs have enough variation in cabinet sizes both across regions and 
over time. Moreover, by moving away from a cross-country analysis we are 
also able to exclude some confounders present in cross-country analyses, as 
the same national institutional setting influences all Spanish regions equally. 
In other words, a subnational level analysis allows us to keep a larger number 
of institutional and contextual characteristics constant.
The Spanish Constitution was approved in 1978 but it was not until 1982-
1983 that most of the regions passed a statute (or regional basic law) and 
held elections — except for the regional governments that complied with 
the ‘fast-track’ requirements plus Andalusia. According to all regional stat-
utes, the regional prime minister has the legal authority to designate the 
regional ministers, who in turn may or may not necessarily be members of 
the regional chamber (only the Prime Minister needs to have a seat in the 
21. For more details see Vall-Prat and Rodon, “Decentralisation”, 725.
22. Indriðason and Kam, “Cabinet Reshuffles”, 329.
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parliament). The regions have had a fair amount of flexibility to design the 
region’s institutional and administrative structure, and have been legally able 
to change or adapt it according to their political preferences.23 
During a certain period, in four ACs there was a legal limit of 10 ministerial 
posts (Comunitat Valenciana and Madrid) or 11 (Canary Islands and Asturi-
as). Only the Canary Islands region still retains this legal requirement. There 
is no legal impediment in the remainder to creating as many ministerial 
positions as they deem necessary. In addition, in some of the new regional 
statutes approved in the 2000s, a 40% gender quota in the cabinet was intro-
duced. Overall, Spanish ACs have developed asymmetrically regarding some 
of the variables of interest, which results in enough variation across regions 
and over time. Crucially, there is substantial variation in cabinet size, party 
systems and economic conditions across the regions.
There are major differences among regions regarding cabinet size. Most of 
the cabinets have between 9 and 14 ministers. Figure 3 plots the distribution 
of cabinet sizes across the different regions. The region of Catalonia leads 
the ranking, while Cantabria and La Rioja have the lowest mean cabinet 
size.
23. Keating and Wilson, “Renegotiating”.
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Figure 3. Variation of regional cabinet size by AC 
Source: Vall-Prat and Rodon (2017)
From a longitudinal perspective, we do not observe a trend towards larger 
cabinets. Since their inception in the 1980’s, regional cabinets grew in mag-
nitude first, but the evolution has not always been consistently positive. As 
Figure 4 shows, in the later period, at the time when the economic crises 
began, the magnitude of regional executives started to decrease.
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Figure 4. Evolution of regional cabinet size by AC 
Source: Vall-Prat and Rodon (2017) 
Following our theoretical expectations, our first explanatory variable aims at 
capturing the state of the regional economy. We employ the most usual macro 
indicator to evaluate the state of the economy, that is, the annual growth of 
the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). 
Figure 5 shows the evolution of GDP growth between 1980 and 2015. During 
most of the period, GDP growth has been positive, although we can clear-
ly identify three periods of recession or economic downturn. The first one 
occurred during the early 1980s, coinciding with the last effects of the oil 
crisis of the 1970s. The second was in the early 1990s and the third, the Great 
Recession, started in 2009. We also observe a period of consistent growth 
during the late nineties and at the beginning of the 2000’s. 
Most importantly for our analyses, we observe substantial variation in what 
concerns GDP growth across regions. This variation will eventually be em-
ployed to study the effect of the economy on regional cabinet sizes. 
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By observing the graphs, it becomes clear that not all the periods of economic 
crisis equally affected all ACs. For instance, in the Great Recession period (2009-
2014) not all ACs had the same yearly reduction in their GDP. Also, among those 
that experienced negative growth, the number of years in which GDP decreased 
diverged substantially. For instance, if we consider Castilla-La Mancha and Cata-
lonia, we can see that both regions experienced negative economic growth from 
2008 onwards. However, while Castilla-La Mancha suffered a long recession 
period — GDP variation was negative from 2009 to 2014 —, Catalonia went 
back to positive growth much sooner than Castilla-La Mancha. Both the GDP 
variation throughout the whole period under scrutiny and the timing of the 
recovery from the recession differs substantially across regions. 
Figure 5. Evolution of the GDP growth in the AC’s between 1980 and 2015
Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE)
As we pointed out in the theoretical part, expectations regarding the influence 
of economic conditions on cabinet size are not ungrounded. It has been com-
mon in recent years in the public sphere to justify the reduction in the number 
of ministerial positions. For instance, the president of Castilla-La Mancha, José 
María Barreda, reduced the cabinet in 2008 from 14 to 10 ministerial posts as 
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a way to “overcome the difficult economic situation”.24 Despite the difficulty 
finding qualitative evidence or statements that justify larger cabinets due to 
good economic conditions, we descriptively observe in the data that the larger 
cabinets mostly occurred during the years of the economic boom (2000s).
A simple correlation analysis shows a positive relationship between cabinet 
size and GDP growth (Figure 6). When we regress regional cabinet size on 
GDP growth we obtain a slope of 0.2, which means that a 5% increase in GDP 
will result in an increase of the cabinet size by one new member.
Figure 6. Relationship between regional cabinet size and regional GDP growth (t-1)
Source: Own elaboration 
Our second theoretical expectation relates to the role played by the number of 
parties and their polarization levels. Accordingly, we first employ a measure 
of fragmentation of the opposition by computing the Number of Effective 
24. Retrieved form the online newspaper Público, http://especiales.publico.es/hemero-
teca/147384/barreda-elimina-cuatro-consejerias-del-gobierno-de-castilla-la-mancha-pa-
ra-afrontar-la-crisis-economica 
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Opposition Parties (ENOP), based on Maeda.25 The ENOP follows the same 
formula Laakso and Taagepera developed to calculate the Number of Effective 
Parliamentary Parties (ENPP), which calculates fragmentation for the whole 
party system.26 In our case, however, we excluded the governing parties — 
parties that have ministerial posts — and applied the same calculation.  
This indicator weighs the number of political parties by their strength (num-
ber of seats over the total number of opposition seats). Thus, if the opposition 
is composed of 3 parties with an equal share of seats, the ENOP will get a 
score of 3. An opposition composed of 3 parties, one of them getting half the 
opposition seats and the other 2 with one-quarter each would get a score of 
2.67. By weighting the number of seats for each party, it is possible to visu-
alize a more realistic view of the fragmentation. Parties holding just minor 
shares of seats are less influential. Figure 7 shows the evolution of ENOP in 
each AC and displays the differences among ACs. 
Figure 7. ENOP per Autonomous Community and legislature
 
Source: Own elaboration
25. Maeda, “Divided We Fall”.
26. Laakso and Taagepera, “Effective Number”.
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Second, we also consider an indicator tackling the level of political polar-
ization. A party system is completely polarized if, for instance, there are 
only two parties and each of them stands on completely opposite ideological 
sides. In a party system with two parties (ENPP=2), one extreme-left and 
one extreme-right, polarization would also be extreme. On the other hand, 
a two-party system with two parties, one centre-left and one centre-right, 
whose ideological differences are minimal, would be non-polarized. We fol-
low the measure of polarization introduced by Dalton,27 who considered 
both the ideology of political parties and their vote share.28 However, we 
slightly modify Dalton’s index by just considering those parties in the op-
position and their seat share over the total number of opposition seats. We 
therefore employ the following formula to compute a Polarization Index for 
the Opposition (PIO):
In order to apply the PIO to the Spanish case we have used survey data from 
the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS).29 The CIS has regularly asked in 
preelectoral or postelectoral surveys a question capturing the perceived ideo-
logical position of political parties on a 0 to 10 scale, where 0 is extreme-left 
and 10 extreme-right. Therefore, each party’s ideological position reflects 
people’s perceived average ideological position on the left-right scale.30 
Unfortunately, some postelectoral surveys did not include a party ideology 
question. Thus, for some legislatures we have relied on surveys carried out 
27. Dalton, “Quantity and Quality”.
28. Although both indicators take vote share for each party into account correlation is very 
low (.102) and statistically insignificant.
29. Surveys are freely available at www.cis.es.
30. In only one election we took a 0 to 10 scale indicator on territorial preferences (0 mean-
ing no decentralization should be granted to the AC and 10 meaning full autonomy, i.e. 
independence). This was the case for the Catalan elections in 2015, since these elections were 
considered to be a plebiscite regarding independence. The indicator on territorial preferences 
is not as frequently asked by the CIS and, in order to maintain comparability, we stick to the 
classical Left-Right ideology indicator although in some ACs and/or time-periods territorial 
preferences might have been more relevant than the classic left-right ideology to understand 
political competition in the regional arena. 
PIO =  √ ∑ Op. seat share partyi .  (partyi ideology score – op. avg ideology)2 5
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during the legislative period. In a few cases (mainly in the early 80s), there 
were no data on parties’ ideology for the entire legislature. We consider these 
cases as missing values. Another problematic issue has been with those ACs 
where very small parties were elected and the survey did not ask respondents 
to place them on the ideological scale. In the cases for which no data were 
available for all parties in parliament, the PIO was computed by assigning a 
centrist ideology (5 on a 0-10 scale) to these parties. Generally speaking, these 
parties represented a small minority of MPs in each regional parliament — 
ranging from 2-10%. Given the fact that parties for which no ideology value 
was available were small, this allocation should not distort the values of the 
overall PIO very much. Figure 8 displays the results of the PIO for each AC 
and legislative term. The PIO ranges from 0, when there was just one oppo-
sition party, to 6.42. As the figure shows, there is substantial variation in the 
level of polarization, both across regions and over time. 
Figure 8. Polarization Index for the Opposition
Source: Own elaboration
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As we did before, we show the correlation between both indicators (ENOP 
and PIO) and regional cabinet size. The correlation between ENOP and GDP 
is positive, while the correlation between PIO and GDP is flat. Although the 
correlations are weaker than the correlation with GDP growth, there are 
reasons to believe, as we hypothesized, that all these factors influence the 
size of the cabinet. In fact, as we elaborated previously, it is also relevant to 
know what happens when both factors are considered at the same time, since 
the hypotheses for each term separately pull the effect towards different 
directions. 
Figure 9. Relationship between regional cabinet size and the a) ENOP, and b) PIO
Source: Own elaboration
In order to test H3c we include the variable majority status in our analyses. 
The relevance of controlling for whether the government holds a majority of 
MPs in Parliament lies in the fact that majority cabinets can pass legislation 
on their own and they do not have to engage in an intense negotiation process 
with other parties. This measure, therefore, distinguishes majority cabinets 
from those that need to rely on parliamentary agreements with other parties. 
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Those cabinets that possess a majority of seats in Parliament will have more 
freedom to develop and execute policies. In other words, they will have more 
flexibility to design cabinet structures at their will and to their benefit. 
Finally, following Verzichelli,31 Indriðason and Bowler,32 and Vall-Prat and 
Rodon33 the empirical analysis also takes into account other possible con-
founders that can explain variation in regional cabinet size. Variables regard-
ing parliamentary and executive characteristics are necessary if we want to 
make the comparison as neat as possible.
One the one hand, we consider the specific characteristics of the executive 
power in the AC. First, we consider the type of cabinet by including a variable 
indicating the number of parties in the cabinet. This allows us to distinguish 
between single-party cabinets and coalitions, but also among different types 
of coalitions, according to the number of party members of the cabinet. Sec-
ond, we consider the ideology of the parties in cabinet by using the ideology 
(in the left-right dimension) of the party or parties in cabinet. For those 
cabinets in which there was more than one political party, the ideology of 
the cabinet corresponds to the ideology of each party weighted by the share 
of seats the party has in the coalition government. To compute parties’ ide-
ological position, we employ the CIS surveys. Third, the analyses include a 
variable that measures the absolute value of the mean ideology of the cabinet 
and the mean ideology of the opposition. This is a way to take into account 
how ideologically distant the government and the opposition are. Fourth, 
we control for the fact that some cabinets are formed during the legislative 
term using a dummy for reshuffled cabinets. Finally, we control for path de-
pendence using the past tenure of the president of the AC by counting the 
number of years she has held this position.
On the other hand, we control for the characteristics of each AC that are 
unrelated to the parties in government. First, we include the population 
(standardized and presented in millions of inhabitants) of each AC for the 
year the cabinet was formed. Second, decentralization dynamics are taken 
31. Verzichelli, “Portfolio”.
32. Indriðason and Bowler, “Determinants”.
33. Vall-Prat and Rodon, “Decentralisation”.
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into account following Vall-Prat and Rodon,34 that is, by introducing vari-
ables regarding the transfer of competences in different areas and also the 
economic capacity of the regions by considering their budget. Finally, we 
include a variable controlling for the congruence of the regional and central 
cabinet following the categorization made by Ştefuriuc.35 
To avoid autocorrelation in the data, it is important to include the lagged 
value of cabinet size in the analyses. Cabinets are not formed in a vacuum 
and there is a tendency to build over existing structures. In other words, it 
is important to control for previous values of cabinet size. 
Summary statistics for the dependent, explanatory and control variables are 
presented in Table 1.
Table 1. Summary statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Cabinet size 281 10.89 2.09 6.00 17.00
∆ GDPt-1 276 3.54 3.72 -5.66 17.54
ENOP 281 1.93 0.85 1.00 4.95
PIO 265 2.41 1.74 0.00 6.42
Majority 281 0.67 0.47 0.00 1.00
# parties 281 1.37 0.66 1.00 4.00
L-R Ideology (Gov) 265 5.88 1.79 1.60 8.67
Ideology Gov-Op 265 3.05 1.10 0.01 6.04
Reshuffle 281 0.43 0.50 0.00 1.00
Years as PM 281 4.09 5.13 0.00 22.00
Population (sd) 277 2.07 0.62 0.32 3.43
Congruence 281 1.02 0.94 0.00 2.00
Economic decentralization 281 4.10 2.70 0.00 11.90
Welfare competences 281 5.96 1.35 0.00 7.70
State competences 281 3.94 1.38 0.00 6.08
34. Ibid.
35. Ştefuriuc, “Government Formation”, Government Formation.
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4. Results
The focus of this article is on the cabinets created in all 17 Spanish ACs 
during the period 1979, when the first cabinet was formed in Navarra, until 
2015 when elections were held in several ACs — the last one taking place in 
Catalonia in September. The structure of the data, one observation per AC 
and year every time the cabinet changes, is a time-series cross-section. Data 
of this type imply a multiplicity of observations for the same entity (AC), 
and also multiple observations at the same time-point for several ACs. This 
structure requires a specific approach to ensure the analyses are not contam-
inated either across entities or over-time.
Accordingly, the methodology used here relies on conventional OLS regres-
sions with legislature and regional fixed effects. The distribution of our de-
pendent variables by region and over time displays an intra-class correlation 
coefficient of 0.40, meaning that 40% of the variance is due to differences 
across panels.
Table 2 shows the main results. It includes 7 different models that allow us to 
put to the test the different hypotheses previously presented. Models 1 and 
2 present the effects of the three main explanatory variables. Models 3 and 
4 include the two blocks of controls. Models 5 to 7 show the effects of the 
different interactions. All models incorporate legislature and AC fixed effects.
Table 2. Regression models using ENOP and PIO
M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7
∆ GDPt-1 0.140*** 0.148*** 0.108*** 0.118*** 0.209*** 0.175*** 0.030
(0.028) (0.028) (0.026) (0.026) (0.056) (0.035) (0.042)
ENOP 0.137 0.371* 0.508** 0.652*** 0.478** 0.512**
(0.185) (0.175) (0.180) (0.195) (0.178) (0.177)
PIO –0.021 –0.129 –0.091 –0.061 0.041 –0.058
(0.076) (0.088) (0.092) (0.093) (0.105) (0.091)
Majority 0.077 0.210 0.165 0.176 –0.221
(0.197) (0.241) (0.241) (0.239) (0.290)
Cabinet Size (lag) 0.443*** 0.435*** 0.415*** 0.405*** 0.423***
(0.056) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.056)
∆ GDPt-1 x ENOP –0.056+
(0.030)
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M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7
∆ GDP (t-1) x PIO –0.032*
(0.013)
∆ GDPt-1 x Majority 0.122**
(0.047)
# parties 0.163 0.151 0.206 0.228 0.243
(0.152) (0.153) (0.155) (0.155) (0.155)
L-R Ideology (Gov) –0.187** –0.221** –0.207** –0.203** –0.227**
(0.069) (0.070) (0.070) (0.070) (0.069)
Ideology Gov-Op –0.057 0.054 0.092 0.079 0.074
(0.141) (0.150) (0.151) (0.149) (0.149)
Reshuffle –0.096 0.007 0.059 0.065 0.062
(0.158) (0.192) (0.193) (0.191) (0.190)
Years as PM 0.041* 0.039* 0.042* 0.047** 0.044**
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Population (sd) 0.195 0.171 0.192 0.159
(0.152) (0.151) (0.150) (0.150)
Congruence (no congruence ref. cat.)
Partial congruence 0.078 0.073 0.089 0.061
(0.298) (0.296) (0.294) (0.294)
Full congruence –0.386* –0.379* –0.362+ –0.352+
(0.189) (0.188) (0.187) (0.187)
Constant 10.01*** 9.324*** 5.234*** 7.108** 6.495** 6.888** 7.189**
(0.247) (0.466) (1.148) (2.415) (2.425) (2.388) (2.383)
Decentralization 
controls
No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
AC FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Legislature FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 276 263 255 254 254 254 254
R2 0.376 0.402 0.596 0.615 0.621 0.626 0.627
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
The results in Table 2 verify our previous expectations regarding the role of the 
economy on cabinet size (H1). Increases in GDP are linked to a larger number of 
ministerial positions across all specifications. The coefficients are positive and the 
statistical significance is high. These results confirm H1: the size of the cabinet 
is very sensitive to economic conditions. Cabinet-designers seem to be aware of 
the positive or negative image associated with larger or smaller cabinets during 
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bad economic times. Growths (or decreases) in GDP crucially shape the size of 
the executive. In substantive terms, an AC in a -2% GDP reduction will have one 
portfolio less than the same AC in a +3% GDP growth, ceteris paribus. 
Following our hypotheses, in Models 5 to 7 we include the different interac-
tions. The results indicate that economic conditions are moderated by other 
political factors. The coefficient and level of statistical significance for the 
GDP indicator change when the interactions are included. This indicates that 
the effect of the economy is conditional on cabinet size and other moderat-
ing factors. We will address the interactive effects of political and economic 
variables in more detail later. 
It is interesting to note that our results contradict Verzichelli’s36 findings 
regarding the effect of economic conditions. Using a sample of Western 
European countries, his analyses indicated that “cabinets are smaller under 
favourable economic conditions than under unfavourable ones”.37 In his re-
search the GDP growth variable has a negative coefficient and it is statisti-
cally significant. However, our results show a robust positive sign. 
There are two possible explanations for these contradicting results. On one 
hand, it might be the case that, by comparing different countries, each one with 
diverse and peculiar institutional settings, different types (and timings) of eco-
nomic shocks, etc. Verzichelli’s model is affected by unobserved confounders. 
This explanation, nevertheless, is alleviated given the large amount of control 
variables he includes in his analyses. On the other hand, results might be con-
tradicting each other because of the different dynamics that affect regional 
cabinets compared to national ones. As we hypothesized, regional cabinets 
tend to shrink when economic conditions deteriorate because they are more 
dependent on economic transfers and are subject to more political and eco-
nomic constraints than national cabinets.38 The results of Verzichelli and the 
findings presented here do not necessarily contradict each other. In our view, 
they appear to be complementary and point to different dynamics when form-
ing cabinets at different layers of government. These different dynamics should 
36. Verzichelli, “Portfolio”.
37. Ibid., 259.
38. A preliminary test (not shown in this paper and available upon request) confirms that 
cabinet size in foral ACs is not influenced by economic conditions, while it is in the other ACs.
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encourage future scholars to challenge existing findings taking into account 
how different factors interact with each other in different institutional arenas. 
Next, we explore the effect of the parliamentary environment (H2) in which 
the cabinet has to navigate in order to succeed in its executive role. Recall that 
we are interested in two different indicators of political division. On the one 
hand, we included the ENOP (H2a) as an indicator of partisan fragmentation. 
On the other hand, we measured regional parliaments’ ideological fragmen-
tation represented by the Polarization Index for the Opposition (PIO).
The above results consistently show that a larger fragmentation of the op-
position parties is associated with more ministerial positions. The effect is 
always positive and, generally, statistically significant. In substantive terms, 
an increase in two ENOP — ceteris paribus — is approximately associated 
with the creation of a new cabinet position. This is in line with our expec-
tation that a larger competitiveness in the legislature — the place where all 
cabinets are born or die — has an effect on the magnitude of the cabinet. If 
the number of actors that control the cabinet increases, the number of new 
cabinet positions also increases.39 
The decision of parties in cabinet to modify portfolios might rely on two 
different factors: voting perspectives and political/parliamentary audits. On 
the one hand, a larger supply of political parties is dangerous for the future 
electoral perspectives of the party (parties) in cabinet. If the executive mis-
behaves, the electorate has more viable parties to support. Also, by creating 
more posts, the government might be interested in making the supervision 
of the executive by the opposition increasingly difficult. Parties in cabinet 
try to reduce the amount of media coverage for the opposition by increasing 
39. One could also hypothesize that the effect of parliamentary fragmentation and polari-
zation on cabinet size might go through the characteristics of the government being formed. 
In other words, the characteristics of the cabinet might mediate the effect of the legislature 
composition on the size of the cabinet. We explored this possibility by carrying out a me-
diation analysis (Tingley et al. 2014). Across different model specifications, the estimated 
average causal mediation effect (ACME) of government characteristics (number of parties, 
status of the government…) is not significant, while the average direct effect (ADE) of the 
effective number of opposition parties is always significant at the 99% level (As in Table 2, 
models with the level of polarization of the opposition show non-significant effects). These 
results essentially mean that the effect of the legislature characteristics have a direct impact 
on cabinet size and that this impact is not mediated by the characteristics of the government 
being formed. 
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the number of political figures in the executive, whose authority and formal 
prestige is granted by law. Also, since the number of political entrepreneurs 
and agents increases, there will be more competition among ministers for 
media coverage.40 Increasing the cabinet allows the government to increase 
media awareness towards the executive vis-à-vis the legislative. 
In a similar vein, we were interested in how ideologically fragmented par-
liaments affect regional cabinet size. According to the models in Table 2, 
polarization of the opposition parties — i.e. the greater divergence in policy 
stances — does not have a statistically significant impact on cabinet size. In 
fact, if anything, the results seem to contradict our expectations in H2b since 
the coefficients are all negative.
Thus, the analysis shows that cabinet size is only affected when the number 
of parties is greater, rather than when policy positions are more distant. 
Cabinet structures seem to react to the threat posed by other parties rather 
than disagreements over courses of action. This finding points to the idea 
that cabinet positions are used by the executive to counterbalance the par-
liamentary opposition, especially when the opposition is numerous, but not 
when the opposition is more diverse ideologically. 
Notwithstanding the previous finding, as we explained before, we cannot 
consider economic and political conditions separately, since they are not in-
dependent from each other. We know that political competition is influenced 
by economic factors, and vice versa. There is a large literature on economic 
voting41 and we know from Dassonneville and Hooghe42 that higher eco-
nomic growth leads to less electoral volatility. Thus, economic conditions are 
likely to influence political conditions. Also, we hypothesized that different 
political structures of competition can lead to different reactions when fac-
ing economic shocks. There are situations in which economic conditions and 
political competition should lead to different cabinet sizes. It is, therefore, 
relevant to study which of the different competing forces (if any) prevails. 
40. Indriðason and Kam, “Cabinet Reshuffles”, in fact, show that agency loss is one of the 
main reasons Prime Ministers reshuffle their cabinets. It is logical to think that larger cab-
inets will have higher chances suffering from agency loss. 
41. Lewis-Beck, Economics and Elections; Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, “Economic Determinants”.
42. Dassonneville and Hooghe, “Economic Indicators and Electoral Volatility”.
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In order to do this, Model 5 in Table 2 includes an interaction of GDP variation 
and ENOP. The effect of this interaction is shown in Figure 10. In the model, 
GDP variation and ENOP maintain their sign and statistical significance and 
the interactive term is negative and significant at the 90% level. This means 
that the effect of one variable is conditional on the values of the other variable. 
Interestingly, the effect of economic conditions is moderated by the number 
of parties. A larger number of political parties in parliament makes cabi-
nets less sensitive to economic conditions. According to the results, when 
the number of parties in the opposition is greater than 2.5, the effect of the 
economy loses its statistical significance. This result means that only when 
the political opposition is circumscribed to a low number of political parties, 
the size of the cabinet is positively associated with the economic conditions. 
In substantive terms, we see that in those ACs where political competition is 
more plural, an economic negative shock does not necessarily lead to small-
er cabinets —provided the remaining cabinet characteristics remain con-
stant—. In contrast, in ACs with less fragmentation, economic downturns 
lead to reductions in the number of ministers. Thus, we can confirm H3a.
Figure 10. Interactive effect of economic conditions and ENPP (Model 5)
Source: Own elaboration
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In model 6 we test H3b and analyse the interactive term between economic 
conditions and polarization. In this model, both indicators maintain their 
sign and significance and the interaction is negative (as it was in the GD-
P*ENOP interaction) and statistically significant. Thus, the effect of the econ-
omy on cabinet size is moderated by polarization in the legislature. Figure 
11 illustrates the effect. As in the case of the effective number of opposition 
parties, the effect of economic conditions on cabinet size is only significant 
when the opposition polarization is low. Thus, our results show that the ef-
fect of the economy only matters when polarization is low. Cabinets only 
increase the number of portfolios according to economic conditions when 
the opposition is less polarized, when polarization is high economic consid-
erations lose relevance when structuring the cabinet. The results for H3a 
and H3b show that economic considerations are only influential when the 
political battles are smooth; when there are too many voices or just strongly 
discordant voices in the political scenario, increases or decreases in portfolios 
are not influenced by economic conditions. 
Figure 11. Interactive effect of economic conditions and ENPP (Model 5)
Source: Own elaboration
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Finally, we hypothesized that the effect of the economy would be conditional 
on the majority status of the cabinet. Majority cabinets are not constrained 
by legislative politics since they have already secured a majority in parliament 
that grants them room for manoeuvre. It is only under minority scenari-
os that political competition will constrain the design of cabinet positions. 
Model 7 in Table 2 includes the interaction of interest. The coefficient of the 
interactive term is positive and statistically significant, which confirms our 
expectations. 
In order to illustrate the relationship, Figure 12 plots the effect of GDP varia-
tions according to the majority status of the cabinet. The graph clearly shows 
that the effect of the economy on cabinet size is not statistically significant 
for those cabinets that hold a minority status. On the other hand, it is clearly 
positive and significant for those being backed by a majority in the parlia-
ment. This means that only for cabinets with a legislative majority, growth 
in GDP is associated to a larger number of cabinet positions. 
Figure 12. Interaction between GDP variation and majority status of the cabinet (Model 7)
Source: Own elaboration
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The fact that the proposed interactions show statistically significant results 
backs our intuition regarding the relationship between political and eco-
nomic factors. As the interactions show, economic conditions influence an 
important decision such as the design of the cabinet structure. However, this 
influence is mainly in place when the executive is not constrained by political 
factors, such as the need to reach agreements in parliament or when it faces 
a lower number of opposition parties. Economy matters, but political factors 
can supersede economic considerations.
5. Conclusions
While marginal in magnitude, the size of the cabinet sends a relevant sym-
bolic message. During bad economic times, governments are as likely to im-
plement cuts as to design several political strategies to counterbalance the 
negative effect of these measures. One of these strategies is to reduce the size 
of the cabinet. Departing from this common empirical pattern, we sought 
to contribute to the relationship between the state of the economy and the 
size of the executive. Conventional wisdom states that cabinet size shrinks 
when things turn sour, and increases when the economy is doing well. Yet, 
we have scarce empirical evidence to prove this relationship. 
In addition, this article has also attempted to analyse the effect of the number 
of parties and polarization on cabinet size. As we argued before, both factors 
are hypothesized to increase the number of portfolios in the executive. Fi-
nally, we argued that the effect of the economy on the size of the cabinet is 
conditional on the number of parties, the level of polarization and whether 
the cabinet holds a majority status. 
Results show several aspects. First, the state of the economy crucially affects 
the size of the cabinet. Second, fragmentation in the number of parties is 
also positively related to larger cabinets. Third, the level of polarization does 
not have a statistically significant effect. Fourth, political characteristics in 
the legislature seem to moderate the effect of the economy on the design 
of cabinet positions. Thus, the economy matters when the legislature is less 
fragmented and polarized and when the government holds a majority status.
The results of this article have an important empirical implication for the 
Spanish case. In recent years, the Spanish political system has evolved from 
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a bipartisan system to a truly multi-party system at the national level. The 
irruption of Podemos and Ciudadanos in the national political arena has im-
plied a fractionalization of the national party system, which has also spilled 
over into the regional political arenas. This has come together with a high-
er fractionalization in regional political systems. According to the results 
presented here, this will make economic considerations less relevant when 
designing the structure of cabinet positions.
All in all, this article has shown the importance of contemplating the eco-
nomic and political dynamics, and the interaction between both, if we want 
to understand how cabinets vary in size. Building on these insights, future 
research can further develop this approach and study how the interaction of 
economic and political conditions affects other aspects of the administration, 
such as spending or the amount of debt. In a similar vein, future studies can 
also delve deeper into how the interaction between economic conditions and 
the composition of the legislature affect coalition agreements both in their 
form and outcome. 
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